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Can Law Foster Social-Ecological Resilience?
Ahjond S. Garmestani 1, Craig R. Allen 2 and Melinda H. Benson 3
ABSTRACT. Law plays an essential role in shaping natural resource and environmental policy, but unfortunately, many
environmental laws were developed around the prevailing scientific understanding that there was a “balance of nature” that
could be managed and sustained. This view assumes that natural resource managers have the capacity to predict the behavior
of ecological systems, know what its important functional components are, and successfully predict the outcome of management
interventions. This paper takes on this problem by summarizing and synthesizing the contributions to this Special Feature (Law
and Social-Ecological Resilience, Part I: Contributions from Resilience 2011), focusing on the interaction of law and social-
ecological resilience, and then offering recommendations for the integration of law and social-ecological resilience.
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INTRODUCTION
Law plays an essential role in shaping natural resources and
environmental policy. Unfortunately, many of the
environmental laws now in place were developed around the
prevailing scientific understanding in the 1960s and 1970s that
the natural world existed within an envelope of predictability –
that there was a “balance of nature” that could be managed
and sustained (Craig 2010). This view assumes that natural
resource managers have the capacity to predict the behavior
of ecological systems, know what the important functional
components are, and successfully predict the outcome of
management interventions (Benson and Garmestani 2011a).
These assumptions stand in stark contrast with reality, and the
tenets of resilience theory. Resilience theory was developed
over the past four decades to explain abrupt changes in social-
ecological systems. Resilience is the capacity of a system to
withstand internal and/or external change yet remain within
the same regime (Holling 1973). If a system is unable to
withstand change, the system may shift into an alternative
regime with a different set of processes and structures. Key
elements of resilience theory include the critical role of cross-
scale dynamics and disequilibrium in social-ecological
systems.  
How can this dynamic, non-equilibrium centered
understanding of social-ecological systems be integrated into
environmental decision-making? This Special Feature (Law
and Social-Ecological Resilience, Part I: Contributions from
Resilience 2011) takes on this question and focuses on the
interaction of law and social-ecological resilience. Climate
change, resource consumption patterns, deteriorating
ecosystems and concomitant loss of services, the demand for
energy, and aging infrastructure all have the capacity to trigger
rapid nonlinear change, as well as social and economic
instability. Uncertainty in these factors challenges traditional
approaches to governance, which often relies on the
assumption that historic data can be used to predict the future.
Although resilience is an emergent property of social-
ecological systems that is increasingly recognized as a critical
consideration for sound environmental management, current
environmental law is largely too inflexible to allow us to
manage for resilience. Legal reform in response to new
information is difficult to achieve under our current legal
paradigm, because the organizational bureaucracy is
conservative and resistant to change (Lazarus 2004). Complex
systems are typically characterized by a regime of variability
within which they oscillate (de Loe and Plummer 2010), but
can exhibit unpredictable behavior when resilience is
exceeded. When resilience is exceeded, a system will
reorganize around a different set of processes, producing
different goods and services for humankind. Alternative states
of systems are sometimes less desirable for humankind, but
may be very resilient, and exhibit hysteresis. In such cases,
changing the system back to the desired state may be difficult,
or functionally impossible. The irreversible nature of many
ecological changes necessitates that laws be reformed to
proactively address potential harms before they occur, rather
than attempting to “restore” ecosystem function and services
after they have been destroyed (Lazarus 2004). This presents
a further complication, because emerging environmental
challenges (e.g., cross-boundary water governance, climate
change) are not easily addressed within the current legal
framework. Even if problems can be identified prior to
systemic response (i.e., regime changes), the solutions require
frequent recalibration of the laws and policies used to address
the environmental problem (Ruhl 1999). A legal system that
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is linear and largely static is ill-suited for the nonlinear
dynamics of linked social-ecological systems. Science is a
process; but while the law seeks resolution, a legal system that
sets a rule and does not revisit and adjust the rule following
assessment of the rule’s effects is incompatible with managing
for resilience (Cosens 2008).  
The articles and responses in this Special Feature explore
several challenges associated with the challenges noted above,
and can be divided into three main themes. The first theme
relates to adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity encompasses
the ability to experiment, learn and innovate in response to
changing conditions in social-ecological systems (Armitage
and Plummer 2010a). Cosens and Williams (2012) explore
adaptive capacity via an analysis of the historical development
of the management of the Columbia River basin. The basin is
managed jointly by the United States and Canada, but the
current treaty between the two countries is under review.
Adaptive management has been utilized on the U.S. side of
the basin, but it has not been successful. Cosens and Williams
argue that although adaptive management is a key aspect to
fostering resilience, it is only one piece of the institutional
changes necessary for resilience-based governance. Walker
(2012) offers that if the rules for changing the rules (i.e., law
for adaptation) can be agreed upon beforehand, then the
mismatch between the law and ecosystems can be reduced.
Walker also contends that the capacity for transformation is
likely more important than adaptive management in a world
of accelerating change, and concludes by making a plea for
more research focused upon understanding, defining and
implementing adaptive governance. 
Green et al. (2013) provide an analysis of the European Union
Water Framework Directive (WFD) through a resilience lens.
The WFD was designed to promote the sustainability of water
resources, and while it did not explicitly incorporate resilience
science into its development, resilience is a necessary attribute
for sustainability. Green et al. (2013) find that while the WFD
does not provide for adequate feedback from monitoring
results and also suffers from a lack of enforcement, it does
provide scale-appropriate governance (i.e., delegation of
control to local levels) and cross-scale information flow. Thus,
the WFD has promise to manage for resilience, but would
require reform with respect to monitoring and enforcement.
Armitage (2013) makes the key observation that legal and
regulatory frameworks need to be adaptive, but also maintain
legitimacy. This is no easy task, and is the subject of a new
wave of research on law and resilience that is essential if
resilience science is to manifest a transition to sustainability.
The lynchpin is likely the reform of administrative law, at least
for U.S. and EU law, and this area should be a focus of research
moving forward (Armitage 2013). 
The second theme is the importance of institutional design and
legitimacy. Garmestani and Benson (2013) offer a resilience-
based framework for the governance of social-ecological
systems based upon integrating principles from resilience
theory with principles from reflexive law. At its core, the
framework requires organizational learning, cross-scale
linkages and generation of adaptive capacity as a means for
governing in a more flexible, iterative and adaptive manner.
Cumming (2013) recognizes that mismatch between scales of
ecosystems and the organizations responsible for managing
them can result in decreased resilience of a system. So, a
system of governance should account for scale and have the
necessary flexibility to account for resilience, while at the
same time having the necessary accountability under the law.
Although reflexive law may not ultimately be the answer to
the problem of managing for resilience, Cumming sees the
potential in the framework offered by Garmestani and Benson.
Cumming recognizes such a framework has potential because
it allows for and encourages innovation at local scales, with
the capacity to scale up, which could offer a solution to scale
mismatches.  
A critical element of institutional design for resilience relates
to the need for the law to be more responsive to the cross-scale
dynamics of social-ecological systems. Ruhl (2012) analyzes
panarchy theory and the law, and argues that while the theory
is “on point” for the no-analog future, it will not gain traction
unless it can be codified into laws and regulations. Panarchy
theory describes hierarchical systems where control is not only
top down, but also bottom up (Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Thus, panarchy theory is useful for explaining the capacity for
nonlinear change in linked social-ecological systems.
Operationalizing panarchy theory will require adaptively
managing legal, ecological and social systems. Ruhl concludes
that panarchy theory does not provide lawyers with a guide
for how to achieve this, as panarchy theory was developed
without lawyers and explicit consideration of the law. Thus,
panarchy theorists, lawyers and decision-makers must develop
a path forward to translate panarchy into law. Holling (2012)
expresses hesitation about the capacity of law to be flexible
and manage for the dynamics of linked social-ecological
systems. Holling suggests the way forward is to encourage
workshops that launch locally designed collaborative
experiments that have the capacity to cross scales and manifest
change.  
The third theme relates to the interface of resilience thinking
with existing resource allocation regimes and environmental
protections. Benson (2012) makes the observation that in the
United States, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been
the primary driver behind ecological restoration efforts
focused upon ecosystem management and tends to focus
management too narrowly. In order for ESA to make the shift
from restoration to resilience, ESA would require several
reforms, including a shift to a systems-based approach,
integrated governance and proactive management of social-
ecological systems. Gunderson (2013) agrees with Benson and
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argues that ESA limits resilience-based management of
ecosystems because it is based upon an outdated conception
of nature (“balance of nature”), as well as the rigidity of the
law as it applies to individual species that are in peril.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is likely that we will have to reform our current legal
frameworks in the United States, Europe and elsewhere in
order to account for the increasing nonlinearities in system
dynamics that are probable in light of accelerating global
environmental change. It is possible that some current laws
have the capacity to be reformed in order to account for
resilience, and therefore provide the capacity for improved
environmental governance (see Benson and Garmestani
2011b). In other cases, wholesale change in the legal regime
will be necessary as we move forward (see Flournoy and
Driesen 2010, Ruhl 2011, Arnold and Gunderson 2013). Based
on the articles in this feature and the integration of the existing
literature on the interplay of resilience and law, we make these
recommendations for the integration of law and social-
ecological resilience:
1. Utilize adaptive management and adaptive
governance
Adaptive management is the process whereby management
actions that have uncertain outcomes, are undertaken in an
explicit framework that reduces uncertainty. Adaptive
management was developed as a way to probe system
behavior, and thus learn about system dynamics, while
allowing management to occur. For sound environmental
governance, networks of private and public entities
communicate and share information (Armitage and Plummer
2010b). In its current form, law does not have the capacity to
account for resilience, other than in piecemeal fashion. Quite
simply, this arrangement may not suffice as we move forward,
because in order to conduct sound environmental governance,
it is important to understand how the scale of interest interacts
with scales above and below (e.g., cross-scale interactions)
(Anderies et al. 2006). Further, adaptive governance builds
upon adaptive management and revolves around decentralized
governance, stakeholder input and informal networks. The
criticisms of this perspective are that it fails to account for law
and formal institutions, avoids difficult decisions between
outcomes and values, and results in ineffective,
unimplemented or undoable governance actions (Arnold
2011). Thus, in order to integrate law and social-ecological
resilience, adaptive governance could be incorporated into
formal legal frameworks, which will require legal reform.
2. Reform of administrative law: “front-end” to “back-
end”
Administrative law governs the process of agency decision-
making to implement substantive law. It is through
administrative law that an agency might be given authority to,
for example, coordinate and share information with other
entities at the same or another hierarchical level. A more
fundamental problem with administrative law is the focus
upon procedural rules (Karkkainen 2005). Thus, the process
of deciding environmental regulations has flexibility, but once
regulations are agreed upon, regulations are rigid in nature
(“front-end”). By setting environmental regulations at the
front-end, the legal process guarantees certainty for legal and
economic interests. While having a formalized legal process
is important for enforceability, it makes it difficult to manage
for resilience in light of our understanding of the dynamics of
linked social-ecological systems. Therefore, the inability of
administrative law to account for uncertainty in the
management process, in essence, means the law is at odds with
science (Karkkainen 2005).  
Shapiro and Glicksman (2004) suggest that, in order to better
accommodate adaptive management, “back-end” adjustments
to regulation could serve as a more effective mechanism. The
back-end adjustment process is viewed as an improvement to
the “guess work that is involved in rationalizing regulations
at the front-end of the process” (Shapiro and Glicksman 2004).
Shapiro and Glicksman (2004) recognize that a regulatory
system that has some flexibility, in appropriate cases, has the
potential to generate the necessary conditions to manage for
resilience. This idea has promise, as resilience-based
management requires an iterative process that improves
management as the process proceeds (i.e., back-end
adjustments). For “back-end” adjustments to be incorporated
into the regulatory framework, Shapiro and Glicksman (2004)
argue that administrative laws need to be amended via deadline
extensions, exceptions, waivers, or variances. A notice and
comment process is the recommended mechanism for back-
end adjustments, but not in isolation (Shapiro and Glicksman
2004). In addition to a notice and comment process, Shapiro
and Glicksman (2004) contend that Congress would also need
to require agencies to establish electronic dockets and create
annual reports on the back-end adjustment process. Thus, in
order to account for resilience in environmental management,
resilience science will need to be linked to enforceable
standards that have some capacity for adaptation (Benson and
Garmestani 2011a).
3. Require communication, monitoring and
intermediaries
Institutional interplay refers to the interaction between
institutions at multiple scales (Wandel and Marchildon 2010). 
The problem of fit manifests when a system is poorly matched
with the institutions tasked with its management (Wandel and
Marchildon 2010). For instance, there can be a spatial
mismatch between exclusive economic zones and marine
systems, where overfishing in one country has impacts on fish
stocks in the exclusive economic zone of another country
(Wandel and Marchildon 2010). The problem here is that
national level institutions do a poor job of managing a natural
resource (e.g., fish) that has no regard for jurisdictional
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boundaries (Wandel and Marchildon 2010). In some cases
temporal mismatch is the problem (Wandel and Marchildon
2010). For example, Canadian fisheries policy reacted too
slowly to early indications of decline in the North Atlantic cod
fishery which ultimately led to its collapse in 1992 (Walters
and Maguire 1996, Wandel and Marchildon 2010).  
Institutions are distinct from organizations, in that
organizations typically have personnel, offices, budgets and a
legal personality (Young et al. 2008). Within this context the
U.S. legal system is an institution with a set of rights, rules
and procedures, while natural resource agencies are
organizations bound to fulfill their mandate within the purview
of the U.S. legal system. In making this distinction, Young et
al. (2008) set the tone for their recent book, but many of their
recommendations for institutions apply to organizations. For
example, there is a gap between science and policy, and Young
et al. (2008) advocate for bridging this gap via “knowledge
brokers” that can bridge the chasm between science and policy.
Kofinas (2009) asserts that linkages between organizations,
institutions and intermediaries (e.g., networks) have the
capacity to foster resilience in social-ecological systems. For
example, the institutional failures during Hurricane Katrina
are attributed to the lack of communication between scales of
governance ranging from local to federal (Kofinas 2009).
4. Account for scale
The rigidity of legal institutions and organizations makes it
difficult to account for cross-scale environmental problems
(e.g., biodiversity loss) (Benson and Garmestani 2011b).
Accounting for scale mismatches between management and
the systems they are tasked with managing, is one of, if not
the critical issue in managing for resilience (Garmestani et al.
2009). The issues with scale mismatches have a long history
of leading to failures in natural resources management. For
example, in 1977, Canada declared an exclusive zone of
fishing for northern cod, which even with these protections
resulted in a ban on northern cod fishing after the fishery
collapsed in 2002 (Dietz et al. 2003). The fishery went into
precipitous decline even though aggregated information on
the fishery indicated that the fishery was recovering. The
lesson learned was that there were smaller (i.e., local) scale
indicators that the fishery was not recovering in the manner
that large-scale, aggregated information suggested (Dietz et
al. 2003). Scale matters, and there is a critical need to monitor
and model at multiple scales for sound environmental
governance (Anderies et al. 2007).  
It is our contention that the critical variable, and the most
difficult one to account for when building adaptive capacity,
is scale. To illustrate this problem, Bohensky et al. (2010)
provide a detailed example of the problems associated with
marine governance. Hughes et al. (2007) identified three major
processes as threats to the Great Barrier Reef, including:
overharvesting of marine resources, declining water quality
due to land-use impacts adjacent to watersheds and climate
change. Each of these threats to the Great Barrier Reef
represents problems at multiple scales (Bohensky et al. 2010).
For example, overharvesting of marine resources results from
local pressure but also international demand; water quality is
influenced by national and international demand for
agricultural and mineral commodities, national and state
environmental policies, and the demands of the regional
economy; and climate change impacts range from global to
local scales (Bohensky et al. 2010). Complicating this issue
further is the fact that the major threats to a social-ecological
system are managed by different organizations operating at
different scales (Conroy et al. 2003). For example, fisheries
are managed at the state level, while national marine waters
and reefs fall under the jurisdiction of the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park Authority; water quality is addressed by the Reef
Water Quality Protection Plan, which involves all levels of
government, as well as industry organizations, indigenous
groups and scientists; and climate change is managed by the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority and the Australian
Department of Climate Change (Bohensky et al. 2010). Since
we are faced with processes operating at multiple scales, this
presents a great challenge for governance of complex adaptive
systems. This illustration of the cross-scale nature of the
processes affecting the Great Barrier Reef illuminates the
importance of scale when considering management actions
(Bohensky et al. 2010).
CONCLUSION
An adaptive approach is difficult to implement due to legal (e.
g., administrative law) and organizational barriers (e.g., lack
of communication between management entities) that are not
in concert with ecological reality (Ruhl 2005), but managing
for resilience (Allen et al. 2011) is critical, and law plays an
essential role. Laws, like management or governance, should,
where appropriate, be implemented experimentally. In other
words, we call for an “adaptive law” approach (Arnold and
Gunderson 2013). Ilg (2010) contends that the standard for
environmental law in the future should turn on the capacity of
the proposed framework to adapt in the face of new
information about flaws in the legal system. A methodology
that has great potential would be based in large part upon
resilience theory, adaptive management and adaptive
governance (Karkkainen 2005). In essence, what is needed is
an iterative approach that has feedbacks built-in between the
ecological and the social system, which allows for policy to
evolve in response to policy experiments, and laws to evolve
in response to legal experiments, and not past assumptions
about the system of interest (Garmestani and Allen 2014).
Here, laws can be applied within an adaptive or structured
decision-making framework, and the utility and effectiveness
of the laws can be assessed through monitoring. Too often
laws are static; we envision a much more dynamic system of
laws in an experimental framework.
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